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LAWYERING IN THE WAKE: THEORIZING THE PRACTICE 
OF LAW IN THE MIDST OF ANTI-BLACK CATASTROPHE 
James Stevenson Ramsey† 
“How does one enact resistance within the space of the 
permissible or exploit the ‘concessions’ of slave owners without 
merely reproducing the mechanism of dominance? What shape 
does resistance or rebellion acquire when the force of repression 
is virtually without limit, when terror resides within the limits of 
socially tolerable, when the innocuous and the insurgent meet an 
equal force of punishment, or when the clandestine and the 
surreptitious mark an infinite array of dangers?” 
Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, 1997 
 
“How can the very system that is designed to unmake and inscribe 
her also be the one to save her?” 
Christina Sharpe, In the Wake: On Blackness and Being, 2016 
 
Lawyers in the United States who consider themselves to be 
progressive are caught between divergent worlds and realities. We 
struggle to define “progress” or even to adequately describe it. We are 
caught between the allures of ambition and professionalism on one hand 
and an adherence to higher principles of morality on the other. We cannot 
easily disentangle our understanding of what is right and wrong from the 
law of the land, and, because of our training and other socialization within 
the halls of power and privilege, we experience dissonance in the presence 
of alternatives to our epistemological frameworks; we falsely become 
convinced that our learned ideals of rule-following—“objectivity,” 
“efficiency,” and “fairness”—are generalizable to all. In other words, our 
interests and investments in those on the margins of society are weakened 
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by both internal and external barriers as we ambivalently strive toward 
whatever “justice” may be. 
Put differently, this dilemma is one of divided loyalties: One of these 
moral commitments is to the people we serve, but the other is a sworn 
fealty to the law, which hurts and justifies hurt, takes and justifies taking, 
especially at the expense of those on the margins of society. We want to 
fight for the oppressed, but we have also promised to uphold the laws of 
the same state that oppresses them. Of course, lawyers interested in justice 
may want to change the state—or at least what it does—for the good of 
all. But the problem that haunts these aspirations, robbing them of their 
coherence, is not only what this state has done throughout history, which 
no legal nor any other solution can fully repair, but also what this state is, 
and what has made and continues to make this state possible. This is a 
dilemma of history, but it is also a problem of ontology and of meaning. 
If lawyers cannot or refuse to grapple with what this state truly is and has 
done, we will be unable to fully grapple with who we are, and we will 
limit our own capacity to provide alternatives to the status quo and to help 
create spaces of life for those who suffer. 
The purpose of this paper, then, is to examine the role of lawyers in 
the context of state violence—not just something like police violence, but 
the state as violence. In particular, I am interested in exploring a 
framework for lawyers whose first obligation is the survival of Black 
people in this context. In other words, what would it mean for lawyers 
who work on behalf of Black communities and social movements to be 
willing to resist the law itself, in terms of belief but also in practice? What 
possibilities for legal practice might open up if we were to theorize 
lawyering from the underside of society, where the law is an existential 
problem? From the ground and its graves, and, per Derrick Bell, the 
“bottom of the well”?1 Here, my theoretical departure point for this 
inquiry is the experience of Black people as thought in Christina Sharpe’s 
In the Wake: On Blackness and Being. She develops her theory from and 
in explication of the fact that, while Black people are not the only people 
who suffer, the suffering of Black people, who live in the wake of slavery, 
is singular and foundational to personhood as established and conceived 
of by the state.2 In this context, this paper explores how this principle 
                                                 
 1 DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 
(1992) (quoting the title of the work). 
2  CHRISTINA SHARPE, IN THE WAKE: ON BLACKNESS AND BEING 22 (2016). The context I 
focus on here is that of the United States, but Sharpe is concerned with the relationship of 
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manifests in the law and how lawyers might act accordingly on behalf of 
those in the wake. 
In the Wake illuminates the ongoing experience of Black people—
the histories, the suffering, violence both extraordinary and quotidian, the 
psychological and (meta)physical condition of social death3—as taking 
place in the wake of chattel slavery, a “past not yet past.”4 As Sharpe 
writes, “I want to think and argue for one aspect of Black being in the 
wake as consciousness and to propose that to be in the wake is to occupy 
and to be occupied by the continuous and changing present of slavery’s 
as yet unresolved unfolding.”5 One aspect of being in the wake of slavery 
that Sharpe explores is that of the “hold,” which is the lower part of the 
ship in which slaves were transported, but also logics, technologies, and 
violences of containment that evolve and extend through time into the 
present day. Much of the hold’s construction and implementation exceed 
any particular form of governance, taking place in and flowing from the 
arenas of rhetoric, meaning-making, and snap judgments, “a peculiar 
disposition of the eyes.”6 However, these violences manifest in and 
receive broad sanction from governing structures—the state in particular. 
In addition to slavery itself, Sharpe raises such contemporary examples 
as poverty, how various governments handle refugee crises, stop-and-
frisk policies, the incarceration of Black people and their murder by 
police, and the education system as constitutive examples of the state-
manufactured hold Black people find themselves in.7 All of these enjoy 
legality.8 
Surviving in and working to undo this hold are what Sharpe refers 
to as “wake work”: 
If . . . we join the wake with work in order that we might make 
the wake and wake work our analytic, we might continue to 
                                                 
chattel slavery to the whole of the African diaspora and humanity more generally, “violence 
at the level of a structure that required, indeed invented, the Black to be the constitutive outside 
for those who would construct themselves as the Human.” Id. at 141 n.10. 
3  ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 38 
(1982). 
4  SHARPE, supra note 2, at 13. 
5  Id. at 13-14. 
6  RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 3 (1952). 
7  SHARPE, supra note 2, at 71-92. 
8  See, e.g., Richard Gonzales, Supreme Court Broadens the Government’s Power to 
Detain Criminal Immigrants, NPR (Mar. 19, 2019, 7:57 PM), https://perma.cc/H2U4-5YMR; 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); ‘What Did Jonathan Ferrell Do?’: Juror Says Defense Put 
Victim on Trial, Guardian (Aug. 23, 2015, 10:03 AM), https://perma.cc/PPF8-JSY3. 
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imagine new ways to live in the wake of slavery, in slavery’s 
afterlives, to survive (and more) the afterlife of property. In short, 
I mean wake work to be a mode of inhabiting and rupturing this 
episteme with our known lived and un/imaginable lives.9 
Different movements for Black freedom and survival have done this 
kind of wake work in different ways, and lawyers have variously 
supported and been a part of these movements.10 There are also many 
examples of lawyers fighting alongside activists for the rights of the 
marginalized more generally in pushes for prison and police abolition, 
reparations for slavery, protecting the land rights of Native Americans, 
and various other social causes.11 And, although much fewer in number, 
there are some examples of lawyers engaging in protest and resistance 
tactics like civil disobedience.12 However, what I am thinking of here is a 
paradigm and a theory of the practice of law that grounds the lawyer in a 
full investment in Black people, their survival, and bearing witness to 
Black life. It is broader and deeper than, though it may include, lawyers’ 
willingness to flout ethical rules for the sake of broader moral principles 
or occasionally and gingerly engaging in some form of civil 
disobedience.13 The frame I am interested in exploring for lawyers is not 
a default respect for the law with resistance as a last resort, but one that 
develops legal praxis and theory primarily from within the hold—wake 
work. 
It is something like what Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. articulates 
in his famous Letter from Birmingham Jail.14 In the middle of the letter, 
Dr. King addresses the consternation felt by other clergy people about his 
and other activists’ “willingness to break laws” with their protests, and he 
begins to articulate the differences between just and unjust laws, primarily 
                                                 
9  SHARPE, supra note 2, at 17-18. 
10 See, e.g., KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS LAWYER (2012). 
11 See, e.g., LAW FOR BLACK LIVES, https://perma.cc/NL5Z-6VBA (last visited Oct. 26, 
2020). 
12 See, e.g., Op-Ed, North Dakota Prosecutors Drop All Serious Charges Against Chase 
Iron Eyes, HIGH PLAINS READER (Aug. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/5RF5-JYB9. 
13 See Louis Fisher, Civil Disobedience as Legal Ethics: The Cause-Lawyer and the 
Tension Between Morality and “Lawyering Law,” 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481 (2016); 
see also Robert M. Palumbos, Within Each Lawyer’s Conscience a Touchstone: Law, 
Morality, and Attorney Civil Disobedience, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (2005). 
14 Martin Luther King, Jr., Martin Luther King Jr.’s ‘Letter from Birmingham Jail,’ 
ATLANTIC, https://perma.cc/43ZB-VM9V (last visited Nov. 2, 2020). 
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from a theological perspective.15 He, for example, uses concepts from 
such thinkers as St. Augustine and St. Aquinas, ending the introduction 
of this section about civil disobedience with St. Augustine’s famous 
quote, “An unjust law is no law at all.”16 In delineating between just and 
unjust laws, Dr. King writes that he is primarily beholden to what is 
“morally right,” and, as such, there is no contradiction for him in urging 
people to both obey Brown v. Board of Education—because it is a just 
law17—and disobey segregation ordinances—because they are unjust.18 
This ongoing moralistic calculation of which laws are valid and which are 
not, along with the broader struggle for civil rights, are to Dr. King a part 
of the United States’ natural movement toward justice as he understood 
it: “We will reach the goal of freedom in Birmingham and all over the 
nation, because the goal of America is freedom.”19 In this letter, Dr. King 
thus collapses patriotism onto his moral framework for civil disobedience 
and onto freedom struggles (or, at least, what he considers to be freedom 
struggles) more broadly, even likening such disparate figures as Jesus, 
early Christians, people who resisted the Nazi regime, and Thomas 
Jefferson to one another.20 
One problem in Dr. King’s theory of civil disobedience lies in the 
historical record he lays out to prove his case. Is the goal of America 
freedom? Whose freedom? We might attempt to derive some principles 
for freedom from, say, the Constitution; but we, like Dr. King does here, 
would have to omit from the record who had to be killed for something 
like the Constitution to exist. Put differently, a freedom founded on and 
funded through domination, through genocide and slavery, is not true 
freedom. A severe abstraction of the dead and their dying descendants is 
required to postulate the moral intentions or destiny of a nation whose 
existence and subsistence is killing and stealing. True freedom, true 
justice, whatever they are, cannot exist in the same space as that kind of 
abstraction, and the United States could not exist without it. The slaughter 
and disempowerment of Native Americans and the enslavement of Black 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. (arguing that just laws are laws that are morally right and uplift human personality, 
and that Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which held that public school segregation 
based on race violated the Fourteenth Amendment, is one such law). 
18 Id. (“Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are 
unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality.”). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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people were not blemishes on the United States’ record; they give the 
United States and the peoples thereof shape. What does it mean, for 
example, that we have a category of personhood and identity like “Native 
American”? Who were Black people before they were Black? And how 
do others relate to and build their identities by distinguishing themselves 
from people in these categories? Such a construction of the state and the 
peoples in it makes “just” decisions like Brown possible, even while 
limiting that decision-making power to a few individuals. In other words, 
we might say that the existence of law is itself unjust here, and appealing 
to the moral force of the law legitimizes the state, which establishes it. 
This implicit recognition of the state’s sovereignty reinforces its 
authority, strengthening the hold it constructs. 
Wake work, thinking intentionally from within the hold, would have 
us see something different from this nation’s romanticized past. 
Theorizing from this place would cause us to see fewer similarities 
between Black freedom fighters and slave owners like Jefferson and more 
between Dr. King and the Black nationalists he decries elsewhere in his 
letter.21 It would require us to see the state itself as a problem, not just an 
institution with problematic actors or tendencies. It would illuminate 
prisons and Native American reservations as witnesses to the state’s 
moral illegitimacy, and it might allow us to see how the terms of 
engagement have already been set against marginalized peoples from the 
start, not just with hostile institutions or state agents. Theorizing from 
within the hold would heighten the stakes and allow us to see with clear 
eyes the disaster in which Black and Indigenous people in the United 
States live. It might also deepen our dissatisfaction with the status quo 
and cause us to realize, like Bell, that the same state granting us our so-
called rights can take them away.22 
What Candice Delmas advocates for in A Duty to Resist: When 
Disobedience Should Be Uncivil seems, like Dr. King’s letter, to tie some 
version of political obligation to resistance.23 However, as the title 
indicates, she explores different philosophical and practical grounds for 
resistance from what Dr. King describes in his letter, not only embracing 
protest and civil disobedience, but also thinking critically about the costs 
and benefits of such tactics as violence or depriving opponents of the 
                                                 
21 See id. 
22 See BELL, supra note 1, at 12-14. 
23 See CANDICE DELMAS, A DUTY TO RESIST: WHEN DISOBEDIENCE SHOULD BE UNCIVIL 
(2018). 
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opportunity to speak.24 For Delmas, this line of inquiry flows from 
citizenship, the political obligations thereof, and the “universal,” “natural 
dut[ies] of justice” that accompany them. As she argues, citizens are at 
times morally and politically obligated to resist, even through illicit 
means.25 
But what of the noncitizen, not in the traditional sense of someone 
from another place,26 but of someone with a liminal (non)status—here, 
but not of here? Scholars such as Anthony Farley observe that Black 
people in the United States are not truly citizens of the United States: 
Citizenship must be distinguished from its documents. 
Citizenship is not the passbook, rather it is the ability to demand 
the passbook. This executive power is reserved for white men. 
Merely documented citizens live in back of the real. The 
documents we all have . . . are all we have. Documents are 
nothing. The real, that is, the representation that we Others live 
behind, is the white man.27 
Delmas mentions that the duty to resist can sometimes extend to 
noncitizens,28 and that, at the very least, citizens’ duty to resist should 
cover the marginalized, which includes noncitizens.29 However, her work 
is not fundamentally concerned with the meaning of concepts like duty 
and resistance from within non-citizenship or from the margins of society. 
In other words, Delmas’s frame is different from Sharpe’s; emphasis on 
survival in the wake is not the same lens as Delmas’s deontological ethics. 
Conversely, wake work is about paradoxically clinging to life amidst 
death and catastrophe. The game has been lost. There is no pre-slavery 
Blackness. There is no un-murdering, no un-spilling of blood. There is no 
available expulsion of a foreign power, as in the case of Gandhi’s India, 
nor is there any reason to foresee or hope for a surrender of our 
government structures to Indigenous folk, as in Mandela’s South Africa; 
apartheid is perfected here. Outside of worldwide upheaval, the state – 
this crystallized settler colony – is here to stay, as are the scars on the 
peoples residing in the underbelly of society, which holds up the rest of 
                                                 
24 Id. at 17-18. 
25 E.g., id. at 8, 57. 
26 Id. at 16. 
27 Anthony Paul Farley, Thirteen Stories, 15 TOURO L. REV. 543, 551 n.15 (1999). 
28 DELMAS, supra note 23, at 16. 
29 Id. at 77-84. 
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it.30 The hold is sturdy, and those who have been disposable are still 
disposable; as a matter of policy, the starved in history can still be starved, 
the historically captured can still be captured (e.g., arrested and 
incarcerated), and so on.31 What would it mean for lawyers to practice 
from this place of containment, from apparent defeat? Not primarily from 
an obligation to universal ideals or political affiliations as Delmas 
describes, but from a collective mourning and hunger? How might 
“politics” and “obligations” be recast in the wake, and how might we 
triage them? Starting from the first analysis of divided loyalties, how 
might lawyers thinking from within the wake determine the relative 
weights of our obligations to the law and to those on the margins? What 
does the law mean to us who are already always the living dead, those 
whose deaths make the world possible?32 
As scholars and movement lawyers have long explained, a singular 
focus on legal remedies for the marginalized in our context has several 
pitfalls and other shortcomings. First, concentrating solely or even 
primarily on the systemic reform of the legal system and/or direct client 
services has not worked. To be sure, it is no longer legal, strictly speaking, 
to segregate schools based on race,33 but housing and school segregation 
persist.34 Lynching is technically illegal, but it persists.35 Police still kill 
Black people, Black children, legally and illegally.36 Mass incarceration 
has been decried by some,37 and yet prisons, along with a visceral, 
systemic need to punish, also persist and are levied against Black people 
                                                 
30 See LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL 
INSECURITY 43 (2009). 
31 See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); see also Mariame Kaba, Opinion, Yes, We Mean 
Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/WGG7-7D57. 
32 See Jared Sexton, Ante-Anti-Blackness: Afterthoughts, 1 LATERAL (2012), 
https://perma.cc/7ZM7-4BU5 (arguing that, although the world “knows itself” through the 
impositions of anti-Blackness and the (social) death of Black people, there may yet be 
possibilities for resistance to be found in and for Black life). 
33 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 717, 78 Stat. 241. 
34 Photos: Where the Kids Across Town Grow Up with Very Different Schools, NPR (July 
25, 2019, 11:06 AM), https://perma.cc/L2M9-5RNT. 
35 See, e.g., Amir Vera, A Georgia Man Was Chased and Killed While Jogging, His 
Mother Says, CNN (May 4, 2020, 10:48 AM), https://perma.cc/H88A-92H8. 
36 See, e.g., Cory Shaffer, Cleveland Police Officer Shoots 12-Year-Old Boy Carrying BB 
Gun, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/2NYU-394V (last updated Jan. 11, 
2019). 
37 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (Diane Wachtell ed., 2010). 
20 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:12 
in particular, who have always been necessarily capturable.38 Some voting 
rights for Black people were secured on paper,39 but they have since been 
both resisted in practice and rolled back formally.40 Wealth inequality 
between Black people and white people has ballooned over time, and, 
even more harrowingly, inequalities in life expectancy between Black 
people and white people still exist.41 I do not mean to dismiss the steps 
toward reducing these inequities that have been made through the law or 
by legal actors. But, as discussed earlier, these injustices are not accidents 
or anomalies; they are constitutive parts of the system as it currently 
exists, and they mean something about who in this country can (still) be 
hurt and stolen from and about what this country is. Appealing to such a 
system to change itself has not been proven effective on its own, as many 
scholars have observed; forms of state oppression merely shift from one 
form to another.42 These so-called reforms leave the violent core of the 
nation intact because they must; the underlying, necessary penchant for 
anti-Blackness and the domination of Indigenous peoples has remained 
as the lifeblood of the nation-state.43 
Second, along these lines, appealing to the state for relief reinscribes 
the state, the coercive power it uses to effectuate its ends, and our own 
status as Black (non)subjects.44 As Anthony Farley explains, praying to 
the state for relief is to accept the power of the state to say “yes” but also 
its power to say “no”: “To request equality is to surrender before one 
begins. To request equality is to grant one’s owners the power to grant or 
deny one’s request. To grant one’s owners such a power is to surrender 
                                                 
38 See David Remnick, Ten Years After “The New Jim Crow,” NEW YORKER (Jan. 17, 
2020), https://perma.cc/2LSM-PEAT. 
39 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. 
40 See N’dea Yancey-Bragg, Voting Rights Act Was John Lewis’ Life’s Work. 55 Years 
Later, Minority Voter Suppression Remains, USA TODAY (July 31, 2020, 5:03 AM), 
https://perma.cc/3MU5-DLWP (last updated Aug. 5, 2020); See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 
U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965). 
41 See Katherine Schaeffer, 6 Facts About Economic Inequality in the U.S., PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/22GA-BCT8; see also Press Release, N.Y. 
Univ. Langone Health, Large Life Expectancy Gaps in U.S. Cities Linked to Racial & Ethnic 
Segregation by Neighborhood (June 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/D934-QMQR. 
42 See BELL, supra note 1, at 9, 12; see also ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 
22-39 (Greg Ruggiero ed., 2003). 
43 See Fred Moten, Blackpalestinian Breath, SOC. TEXT ONLINE (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/R69N-PJX9 (discussing the anti-Black and anti-Indigenous practices of 
states). 
44 See FRANK B. WILDERSON III, AFROPESSIMISM 15 (Bob Weil ed., 2020) (discussing how 
Blackness is denied subjectivity). 
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oneself to one’s owners entirely and completely.”45 To recognize this 
power is to submit to the law’s (necessary) privileging of its interests—
those that give it coherence and legitimacy: the erasure of Native 
American peoples and the infliction of perpetual suffering upon Black 
people as punishable, malleable, detestable flesh46—over our own: 
To pray for legal redress is to bow before the authority of law . . . . 
Law is only the relation of white-over-black to white-over-black 
to white-over-black. When we follow a legal rule we follow only 
the track that we have ourselves laid down. In other words, we 
ourselves are track, we become the track when we lay down, and 
we follow that track white-over-black into the future that lasts 
forever.47 
Third, as various scholars have observed, focusing on legal redress 
to the exclusion of other tactics and remedies, which lawyers are prone to 
do, has the potential to block the building of power in the communities 
those lawyers serve, creating serious problems in movement work.48 For 
example, such a focus often contains social action and energy within the 
domain of the courts, as opposed to building sustainable structures and 
practices within the community itself.49 There is a lurking tendency for 
lawyers, because of our conservative, risk-averse training, to quell radical 
thought and tactics—in the name of precedent and rationality—and 
instead bow to the law.50 Because strictly legal approaches often rely on 
the unique credentials, skill set, and language of lawyers, such approaches 
can center and empower lawyers in movement strategy, rather than 
empower activists and members of the community.51 A law-focused 
                                                 
45 Anthony Paul Farley, The Apogee of the Commodity, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1229, 1238 
(2004). 
46 See ZAKIYYAH IMAN JACKSON, BECOMING HUMAN: MATTER AND MEANING IN AN 
ANTIBLACK WORLD (2020) (arguing that Western science and philosophy have conceived of 
and violently rendered Black people as malleable containers for various anti-Black ideas, 
which, through contrast and hierarchy, stabilize the self-perception of the Western (i.e., white) 
subject.). 
47 Farley, supra note 45, at 1238-39. 
48 See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and 
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 490 (2001); Charles Elsesser, Community Lawyering—
The Role of Lawyers in the Social Justice Movement, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 375, 376 (2013); 
Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Client Activism in Progressive Lawyering Theory, 16 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 109, 109 (2009). 
49 See Capulong, supra note 48, at 147. 
50 See id. at 152. 
51 See id. at 151-53. 
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approach tempts lawyers and community members alike to conflate the 
lawyer’s role with that of an organizer, which is problematic because 
lawyers and organizers tend to employ different frameworks and 
techniques.52 Our legal system tends to atomize legal disputes and claims, 
often forcing legal proceedings into person-against-person conflicts and 
making it difficult for collective legal action, coalition building, and 
redress of harms on a community level.53  
Furthermore, an adversarial solution may not be what is needed at 
all, but that is the default problem-solving disposition of courts and, 
therefore, lawyers. The very presence of lawyers can turn what ought to 
merely be a difficult conversation into something else entirely, 
substituting state coercion for community-led solutions. And, 
importantly, if and when legal relief is denied to a community that has put 
all of their hope and energy into such a remedy, momentum for the 
underlying movement may evaporate or be critically wounded.54 Of 
course, all of these can be mitigated at least somewhat by a lawyer in a 
community who is aware of and trained to recognize and avoid these 
dangers, but these harmful tendencies inherent to traditional legal practice 
often exceed our best intentions and are not limited by our competency. 
The law is the law, after all. 
However, there may be alternative theories and praxes for lawyers 
seeking to live and encourage life in the wake. In her work, Sharpe names 
“aspiration” as a form of wake work, and this form can itself take several 
different shapes.55 Referring to this concept of aspiration, she writes, 
“What is the word for keeping and putting breath back in the body?”56 I 
add: How might lawyers participate in this guarding and return of the 
breath? She writes further: 
What is the word for how we must approach the archives of 
slavery (to “tell the story that cannot be told”) and the histories 
and presents of violent extraction in slavery and incarceration; the 
calamities and catastrophes that sometimes answer to the names 
of occupation, colonialism, imperialism, tourism, militarism, or 
humanitarian aid and intervention?57 
                                                 
52 See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 48, at 493-96. 
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And how might lawyers in particular tell these untellable stories or 
make space for their telling in a system that does not want to hear them? 
What other words, lexicons, and media might we employ? Sharpe probes 
more: “What are the words and forms for the ways we must continue to 
think and imagine laterally, across a series of relations in the hold, in the 
multiple Black everydays of the wake?”58 Relatedly, what are the ways in 
which lawyers might be able to help build and develop relationships in 
the wake and not just intervene in their abuse? And what are ways of 
addressing abuse that do not replicate the punitive impulses and harms of 
the carceral state? 
The stakes of this—of aspiration—for Sharpe are no less than life 
itself: 
I’ve been thinking about what it takes, in the midst of the 
singularity, the virulent antiblackness everywhere and always 
remotivated, to keep breath in the Black body. What ruttier, 
internalized, is necessary now to do what I am calling wake work 
as aspiration, that keeping breath in the Black body?59 
Elsewhere, Sharpe mentions the guilty verdict returned for Ted 
Wafer, Renisha McBride’s murderer, describing it as something that 
“brought, perhaps, a little breathing room before the next onslaught, the 
next intake of air, the held breath.”60 She goes on to qualify this, though: 
“In the weather of the wake, one cannot trust, support, or condone the 
state’s application of something they call justice, but one can only hold 
one’s breath for so long.”61 Like Sharpe, I think guilty verdicts for 
murderers of Black people can feel like breathing room to some of us, 
giving us a sense of relief, because harm was recognized. But I do not 
think that guilty verdicts such as these can sustain our people. They feel 
like false breaths to me, like breathing in air that has insufficient oxygen, 
not quite enough for our lives and potentially toxic. And importantly, they 
are only retrospective; punishment will not raise the dead, and its 
deterrent effect is minimal in a society that knows itself through the death 
of Black people.62 
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But are there ways that lawyers can cultivate the recognition of harm 
that are not motivated by a desire to punish? And are there ways lawyers 
can participate in the prevention of harm—insisting on the sacredness of 
Black breath—that are more effective than punishment? Protest and 
shame have long been tools of liberation movements all over the world, 
and lawyers have defended those protestors.63 However, if survival is the 
question (and it is), lawyers in the wake ought to broaden their scope and 
consider desperate actions for these desperate circumstances, taking less 
timid steps toward helping people survive, even and especially those who 
are not meant to. For example, what would it look like for more lawyers 
to be the disruptors in court? To be willing to be held in contempt? What 
would it mean for lawyers, alongside (and accountable to) the 
communities they serve, to overrun media outlets, legislative offices, law 
firms, and prosecutors’ offices? To occupy judges’ chambers? 
Similarly, if we have to fight for our breath, if violent self-defense 
(and violent resistance, more generally) is a preventative solution that a 
community embraces, what might the lawyer’s role be? Of course, the 
lawyer can defend members of this community in court. But perhaps, at 
times, what survival demands, what wake work is, is for lawyers to be 
willing to take up arms themselves, as Mandela was during his own legal 
practice.64 There is a practical bar to widespread violent rebellion here; 
Black people in the United States are not likely to survive a war with the 
United States, and regardless, that is not what I am thinking of here. I am 
more interested in the question of framing and of which principles—with 
all of their philosophical legacies and racialized baggage—emerge 
victorious when survival in the wake is the guiding theory for legal 
practice. Along these lines, and within the hold, non-violence may appear 
to more closely resemble an available strategy than an ethic to be adhered 
to, and lawyers should think critically about their role in participating in 
and, if appropriate, helping in the strategic guidance of violence and non-
violence. 
Within Sharpe’s conception of aspiration, there is also the question 
of fugitivity. In Stolen Life, Fred Moten explicates the always-fugitive 
quality of Black existence as expressed in Black artistic and aesthetic 
formations: 
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Fugitivity, then, is a desire for and a spirit of escape and 
transgression of the proper and the proposed. It’s a desire for the 
outside, for a playing or being outside, an outlaw edge proper to 
the now always already improper voice or instrument. This is to 
say that it moves outside the intentions of the one who speaks and 
writes, moving outside their own adherence to the law and to 
propriety.65 
What would it mean for wake lawyers to harness this fugitivity, this 
breath-in-secret, to embrace it and weaponize it? We may consider this as 
an extension of abolitionist resistance to the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 
and 1850,66 where, today, lawyers—again, in consultation with and with 
consent and input from communities to which they are accountable—can 
truly act as accomplices to the cause of freedom and survival for those 
who resist. I think of those like Assata Shakur and Angela Davis. Are 
there more Assatas—the already persecuted, already convicted (truth be 
damned),67 already dead, who yet dare to resist and/or escape—to be 
found and supported? Might lawyers more often expand and support the 
fugitivity inherent in Blackness? Consider Judge Shelley Joseph, the 
Massachusetts district court judge accused of helping an immigrant elude 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents.68 Might her alleged 
behavior be an available blueprint for lawyering in the wake, a way for 
lawyers to subversively embody the “ordinary note of care” Sharpe is 
concerned with in her work?69 
In addition to aspiration, Sharpe also raises the twin practices of 
Black annotation and Black redaction as forms of wake work. She takes 
these practices as ways of refusing “to accede to the optics, the 
disciplines, and the deathly demands of the antiblack worlds in which we 
live, work, and struggle to make visible (to ourselves, if not to others) all 
kinds of Black pasts, presents, and possible futures[.]”70 In other words, 
they are methods of reducing (i.e., redacting) or expanding and/or 
commenting on (i.e., annotating) words, images, stories, and worlds of 
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and about Black people, which are often shrouded in anti-Black rhetoric 
and/or violence, in order to illuminate possibilities for resistance in the 
wake and Black lives as they are lived: “Redaction and annotation toward 
seeing and reading otherwise; toward reading and seeing something in 
excess of what is caught in the frame; toward seeing something beyond a 
visuality that is . . . subtended by the logics of the administered 
plantation.”71 
In Sharpe’s book, one example of these kinds of practices is the 
independent autopsy of Michael Brown’s body along with her 
meditations on the story it tells—of an unarmed teenager shot down as he 
surrendered.72 Another example she points to is filmmaker Julie Dash’s 
representation of the violence of slavery in her film Daughters of the Dust 
through indigo dye, with which Sharpe contrasts the mutilated bodies 
often featured in other films about slavery.73 In sum, Black annotation and 
redaction are about “say[ing] more than what is allowed by an archive 
that turns Black bodies into fungible flesh and deposits them there, 
betrayed.”74 
Lawyers can also participate in this wake work. There are particular 
archives lawyers must access and manipulate as a part of our profession: 
case law, statutes, narratives, police reports, evidence, testimony, and 
documents produced in discovery, to name a few. What new things might 
be revealed, what untellable stories might be articulated, when lawyers 
break free of traditional forms and norms of legal and academic discourse 
and into something like Sharpe’s notions of annotation and redaction? If 
lawyers approached the law and its materials less as talismans to hide 
behind and more as a set of materials to be creatively grappled with and 
severed and spliced? The task of lawyers is to parry the legal record, to 
render Black life visible as it exists, which means fostering a counter-
hegemonic imagination, even and especially against our systems and the 
narratives grounding them: “Put another way, with our own Black 
annotations and Black redactions, we might locate a counter to the force 
of the state . . . .”75 For lawyers, this annotation may look like poetry or 
visual art in the middle of a brief, or a song in the middle of a trial, or 
more editorializing of the law in arguments, using the law as an occasion 
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to speak to, see, and honor Black life, as opposed to a divine tablet to be 
enshrined.76 Black annotation for lawyers is to insist on the speaking of 
the unspeakable thing. 
As the other side of Black annotation, Black redaction for lawyers 
may resemble something like focus, a cutting away of noise in order to 
foreground what matters. What radical forms of focus are available to 
lawyers in the wake, and how might they be implemented? Which 
archives may be distilled, and to what? In what form? As in annotation, 
lawyers should seek to not only uncover the hidden through the act of 
covering, as in Sharpe’s focusing on the eyes in the pictures of enslaved 
people,77 but they should also seek to resist the necropolitics of Black 
hypervisibility. There is a real temptation to broadcast Black suffering in 
an attempt to shock the powers that be into submission or into being 
moved to a particular remedy.78 However, as Sharpe and many others 
have observed, such portrayals normalize the Black suffering that is 
already a constitutive part of the world in which we live: “That is, these 
images work to confirm the status, location, and already held opinions 
within dominant ideology about those exhibitions of spectacular Black 
bodies whose meanings then remain unchanged.”79 Black redaction as a 
frame and method, then, may allow lawyers to tell Black stories and bear 
witness to Black lives in the fullness of their hardship and beauty, without 
adding to the atmospheric suffering around us. This might mean that 
photographic evidence needs to be curated or portrayed in some other 
way. It could involve different, innovative objections being raised in court 
proceedings, more than objections to graphic evidence for being unfairly 
prejudicial, but objections on the grounds of dignity and to the kind of 
suffering we will accept as normal. As a strategic matter, Black redaction 
may mean subversive resistance through concealing something (e.g., 
from prosecutors, police, the courts, and other state actors and apparatuses 
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—again, in partnership with and deference to the community to which the 
lawyer is accountable) that would bring about death. 
But Black redaction does not merely limit—it also offers us a way 
to see differently, to imagine otherwise. Here, lawyers may explore 
what new stories may be told through the act of limiting and reducing. 
For example, what might a judicial opinion or police report generate if 
everything were redacted but the words “Black” and “resist” (as in 
resisting arrest)? What if we could perform some sort of statistical 
study on the relationship between these words in government 
documents? The Department of Justice (although they must never be 
mistaken for performers or proponents of wake work) did something 
like this in their investigation of Ferguson, Missouri:  
African Americans [67% of Ferguson’s population] account for 
95% of Manner of Walking charges; 94% of all Fail to Comply 
charges; 92% of all Resisting Arrest charges; 92% of all Peace 
Disturbance charges; and 89% of all Failure to Obey charges.80 
In the officers’ view, the man resisted arrest by pulling his arms 
away. The officers drive-stunned him in the side of the neck.81 
Officers pushed him to the ground, began handcuffing him, and 
announced, “stop resisting or you’re going to get tased.” It 
appears from the video, however, that the man was neither 
interfering nor resisting.82 
And, apart from empirics, Black annotation and Black redaction in 
legal practice ought to challenge the law itself; to highlight its 
inconsistencies, its technologies of death, and its deadly foundations and 
underpinnings; to constrict the narratives that uphold oppression and 
loosen the stories that honor and help those on the margins survive.83 The 
task for lawyers would be to implement such practices in those venues 
where we have particular access and privilege alongside communities that 
do not. However, these challenges to Black suffering will themselves be 
challenged; because they are inherently destabilizing to a world stabilized 
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by anti-Blackness, these stories are not the stories the law is inclined to 
tell nor will always allow to be told.84 However, for us to survive, they 
must be told—by any means necessary. 
 
         - - - 
 
The theoretical framework explored here has no reverence for the 
law, but this paper is not seeking to develop theories about anarchism or 
chaos, although those may be legitimate means or ends for some. I am 
interested in seeing the law for what it is and allowing that to guide our 
practice of law, for the sake of surviving it along with the other conditions 
of the wake of slavery. In other words, this paper’s primary interest is in 
revolting against death, what such a task might require of lawyers, and 
how our arsenal of tactics and theories might be expanded for the sake of 
this insurgency. As has been explored above, the law is steeped in the 
death we resist, but I recognize without reservation that it is sometimes 
necessary to engage with the law, often on its own terms. This 
undoubtedly means that a deft navigation of the law is often helpful, and 
intermediate measures of harm reduction through the changing of harmful 
laws may be important. While I maintain that Black survival sometimes 
demands that the law be broken, I respect that some may be hesitant to 
embrace this notion as a practical matter. I affirm the need for practicality 
and strategic thinking; resistance comes at a cost, and different lawyers 
may occupy different roles in the cause of Black survival, just as there are 
different roles available within any movement. I do not think every lawyer 
should always or routinely break the law. 
But, extending Sharpe’s metaphor, if we understand the law as an 
important plank in the hold that contains Black people in the wake of 
slavery, what would it mean for us to consider prying that plank from its 
position in the ship? If liberation and survival are what we need and are 
fighting for, if life is at stake, would this not warrant a bit of tampering 
with the thing constraining and killing us? What might it become if we 
broke that plank? Firewood? A weapon? A lever to warp or tear away 
other planks?85 What would it mean for architects or carpenters—those 
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familiar with woodwork, trained in its construction and usage—to be the 
ones messing with the planks? And, if the planks must be tampered with 
or broken so that we can live, aren’t the carpenters uniquely qualified and 
well-positioned to do it effectively? 
